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
RESEARCH REPORT

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THE USE OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY (U)


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LIEUTENANT COLONEL DENNIS L. VOSS

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE USE OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY (U)

by

Dennis L. Voss
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Peyton Lumpkin

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 1990

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis L. Voss (MS, Arizona State University) has been interested in humanitarian airlift by tactical airlift since he began flying the C-130 and was awarded the Humanitarian Service Medal for his participation in relief efforts in Southeast Asia. He has accumulated over two thousand hours of C-130 flying time while stationed at various bases in the United States, the Pacific Area, and Europe. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, Class 77, and of the Air War College, Class of 1990. .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Use of Tactical Airlift as a Tool of Foreign Policy

AUTHOR: Dennis L. Voss, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

During the Berlin blockade, the United States supported the beleaguered city with airlift support. After a year, the Soviet Union gave up--the allies had won. In the years since, the United States has provided humanitarian aid around the world with the quick response of its airlift capability, and this aid is used as an extension of its foreign policy. For example, in Africa, the United States has provided food in an attempt to stem the tide of communism. In some cases, the aid was provided through the United Nations because the country needing the aid did not match our definition of human rights, they advocated terrorism, or one of several other foreign policy factors. In the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine is closely tied to our foreign policy, but has not always been a guiding principle. Nicaragua is a prime example where under President Reagan no aid was provided following a 1988 hurricane. Our military-airlift aircraft quickly deliver nearly every form of humanitarian aid around the world. Tactical-airlift aircraft are a key factor in this transportation equation because it has the capability to move it closer to the area where the aid is needed through airdrops and because of its ability to land on short, unimproved strips. For example, following an earthquake in the interior of Peru, C-130s and C-123s airdropped and airlanded equipment and supplies directly into the mountains. Tactical airlift has a positive impact on US humanitarian-aid efforts which are an extension of our foreign policy.

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The Use of Tactical Airlift as a Tool of Foreign Policy

On 24 June 1948, the Russians stopped all surface traffic from western Germany to Berlin with the intent of starving the western powers out of the city.¹ The following morning, General Lucius D. Clay, commander of Berlin, asked the United States Air Forces in Europe under General Curtis E. LeMay to begin flying in food.² Thus began the largest and best-known peacetime airlift ever undertaken.

Since the year-long airlift, the United States has deployed its airlift aircraft around the world to deliver humanitarian aid to friend and foe alike. We have used this aid to eliminate or alleviate suffering from natural disasters, drought, and from military action. I will examine humanitarian relief efforts as a subset of our foreign policy. Then I will look at the use of US tactical airlift as tool in carrying out our humanitarian relief efforts as a part of our foreign policy. I will look only at natural disasters in Africa, Mexico, and Latin America and not at military actions.

FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND

In 1947, Mr George Kennan, charge d'affaires in our Moscow embassy, coined a new philosophy of US foreign policy with respect to the Soviet Union. He said our policy "must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of the Russian expansive tendencies."³ By this, he meant we should use economic means rather than threatening military action to contain the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union.⁴ Containment thus became President Truman's one-word foreign policy statement, and ultimately that of the presidents following him.

Although each president from Eisenhower through Reagan used containment as the basis of his foreign policy,⁵ each modified the containment philosophy as the world scene changed. Presidents Nixon and Reagan made the biggest changes. Until Nixon, the United States attempted to serve as corner policeman for the world. Nixon changed that stance with his policy of providing military and economic assistance only if an ally or vital US interest were involved. Other nations were required to ask for support and the assisted nation must provide manpower. Thus the corner policeman became the policeman at the precinct office, ready to respond when called.

Reagan was more assertive in his foreign policy than any of his predecessors. He wanted not only to prevent the dominoes from falling but even to push the tipping ones back into an upright position. Further, Reagan got out in front of the American people to rally them to this get-tough foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN AID

Four cases of humanitarian aid help describe its use in our foreign policy. The first of these attempts to prevent the expansion of Marxism. An effort may be undertaken to stop Marxism when it has a foothold or to prevent Marxism from even achieving a niche. Mozambique provides an excellent example of an established Marxist government that the US has tried to influence. During famines in Mozambique and Angola, we shipped food aid directly to Mozambique. Relief to Angola went through the UN. We provided aid directly to Mozambique with the intent of moving them toward a more westerly oriented track.⁶

Numerous examples come to mind when one considers aid provided to prevent communism from getting established in a country. The US and other nations carried out relief efforts for disasters as sudden and devastating as an earthquake or as slow and tortuous as drought and famine. Famine involved more people than any other disaster. It was pervasive throughout Africa, Mexico,

and Latin America. According to United Nations information, the citizens of eleven countries from Africa and Latin America suffered from famine.⁷ These countries include Ethiopia, Mauritania, Chad, Sudan, Niger, Upper Volta, and Mali in Africa, and Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guyana in Latin America. Famine relief to Mauritania, Chad, and Mali in 1973 and 1974 probably displays our best attempt to stop communism before it got a firm toehold.

The second case of aid in support of our foreign policy arises from our 150-year-old Monroe Doctrine. The US still follows the Monroe Doctrine and views the Western hemisphere as a "special preserve."⁸ Although we certainly would not forbid non-Western Hemisphere aid to countries in the area, we risk softening the Doctrine and indicating that outside forces may "invade" the hemisphere if we do not provide aid ourselves. Peru and Nicaragua are both Western Hemisphere countries which come under the Monroe Doctrine. The two countries were treated quite differently. The US set aside its differences with Peru following the earthquake in 1970 after a request by Peru for aid. We sent helicopters, tactical and strategic airlift aircraft, and naval ships.⁹ Large amounts of aid were taken to Peru and then moved directly to the areas where it was needed.

In the third case, our foreign policy did not provide humanitarian aid. In Nicaragua, we did not provide aid following the devastation of Hurricane Joan in 1988, for two reasons. First and most importantly, Nicaragua did not request aid. Without an appeal for aid as noted previously, US interest in a country must be overwhelming for the US to volunteer humanitarian support. Second, contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, US relations had fallen so low with Nicaragua we risked a "loss of control" in the hemisphere. One author wrote the "Miseries being endured . . . came as a joy to Washington."¹⁰ We wanted the Nicaraguan government to flounder in its own ineptitude and collapse.

The final example of humanitarian aid as an element of our foreign policy occurred in Brazil. We did not provide assistance to Brazil during the famine there in the early 1980s for the same reason a lack of a request. The US was able to provide famine relief, as we had been demonstrating for many years in Africa. However, Brazil preferred to handle its own internal natural disasters. They were not too proud to ask for or accept aid. They were afraid the US would flex its muscles and try to direct things, as they had once before.¹¹

The use of humanitarian aid in three African countries, Angola, Algeria, and Tunisia, helps demonstrate our worldwide foreign policy. Even more smartly than Mozambique, Angola marches to the drum beat of Moscow, and it has Cuban troops stationed in country. The US has tried to in recent years to improve relations with Angola with little success.¹² Contrary to our direct-support attempts with Mozambique, the US sends aid to Angola through third-party organizations such as the United Nations. As long as Cuban troops remain in Angola and Angola continues to fight a democratic government in Namibia, the US will not provide direct aid.

Algeria presents another interesting example. Although the US provided aid to Algeria after its earthquake in 1980, we provided only cash. Algeria was fighting a proxy war with Morocco, our ally in the Western Sahara.¹³ Algeria did not fit well into our foreign-policy pie and did not get the more visible equipment and supply support we have provided other earthquake victims.

On the other hand, when floods hit Tunisia in 1969, the US sent \$1 million as well as airlift support. Tunisia maintains a very pro-Western attitude for an Arab nation. In most cases, Tunisia sides with the West on matters dealing with Israel.¹⁴

These few examples clearly demonstrate the US uses humanitarian aid as a foreign policy tool. We provide assistance directly, indirectly, or withhold

it. How does tactical airlift play a role in carrying out our foreign policy? The answer lies in providing direct assistance to humanitarian relief efforts.

DISASTER RELIEF AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

Tactical airlift covers the globe with airlift capability, and when direct assistance is provided, tactical airlift is normally involved. A listing of previous humanitarian relief efforts is provided in the Appendix. I will specifically focus on a handful of humanitarian relief efforts to determine the significance of the tactical airlift role.

Although not the only disaster in Africa, famine certainly far outweighed any other natural disaster. We used C-130s in Chad, Mauritania, and Mali in Operation Authentic Assistance in 1973 and Operation King Grain in the summer of 1974 to bring grain to the famine victims.¹⁵ Food was not the only thing airlifted during Operation Authentic Assistance. We carried goats, sheep, and water buffalo and helped relocate people.¹⁶ The motto of tactical airlift remains, "You call, we haul." As noted earlier, we provided food aid to Mauritania, Mozambique, and Angola as well.

Of all the countries in Latin America, Mexico may be facing the biggest problems. Mexico's birth rate continues at an uncontrolled rate, and its economy staggers under the weight of uncontrolled high foreign debt after the price of oil declined. In addition to these man-made "unnatural" disasters, Mexico faced its share of natural ones. Two massive earthquakes hit Mexico in twelve years, one of which was accompanied with floods. During this same time, the people of Mexico have also been the victim of a volcano and a hurricane.¹⁷ After the massive earthquake in Mexico City in 1985, the Air Force dispatched not only C-130s but also C-5s and C-141s loaded with search equipment and relief aid.

Famine has been a continuing problem throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America, as it has been in Africa. Compounding this food shortage problem have been earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, and floods, which have occurred from Chile in the south to El Salvador in the north and Haiti to the east. In nearly every case, the United States has come to the aid of its fellow American states with airlift support. For example, in Central America, following flooding in Costa Rica in the early 1970s, C-123s took in over 100 tons of supplies.¹⁸ In 1976, C-130s airlifted 125 tons of supplies to Guatemala following the earthquake there.¹⁹

The US support for Peru previously mentioned demonstrated a total involvement of US military support.²⁰ The full airlift spectrum from helicopters to C-5s, as well as a Navy ship, brought aid and heavy construction equipment to Peru. C-141s and C-5s helped bring in equipment from the United States, and the capabilities of tactical airlift enabled those resources to carry the relief aid directly to the points at which it was needed. C-123s and C-130s airdropped and airlanded food in the remote mountain areas which were otherwise inaccessible following the earthquake.

The US has also used its tactical airlift resources to help transport other material to South America, e.g., we have airlifted construction equipment to help develop remote areas.²¹ Following a change in a Federal law, Air Force Reserve units transported equipment and supplies donated by private organizations to Latin American countries. Besides essential medical equipment and supplies, they carried a fire truck and an ambulance to El Salvador.²²

Tactical airlift also conducted a special mission--not quite so unusual as carrying goats in Africa--of transporting 1500 Venezuelan elementary-school children to other parts of their country so they could learn more about it.

The government of Venezuela, with the assistance of American C-130 and C-47 crews, was rewarding the children for doing exceptionally well in school.²³

DISASTER RELIEF, FOREIGN POLICY, AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

Tactical airlift has played a substantial role in supporting disaster relief efforts throughout the three areas under review and is used in similar roles worldwide. It is clear that foreign policy controls our disaster relief efforts. How does tactical airlift support our foreign-policy objectives? Humanitarian relief via tactical airlift responds to US foreign-policy objectives with highly visible support and direct assistance. Before aid is provided, policymakers must determine how a devastated nation fits into our foreign policy basket. Then the makers of foreign policy address the type and method of support. The deployment and military capabilities of tactical airlift aircraft perhaps make it easier to decide in favor of active assistance. Let us look at some of these advantages.

The United States deploys tactical airlift in many areas around the world. The Air Force currently has its only tactical airlift aircraft, the C-130, deployed in permanent units in Europe and Japan. The units in Europe provide tactical airlift support for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, while the ones in Japan do the same for the western Pacific. There are also C-130s on temporary duty in the Panama Canal Zone for Latin America operations. These aircraft cover a major portion of the globe where we have interests. Although the C-130 lacks the speed of the strategic airlift aircraft, as did the C-119 and C-123 in the past, its forward deployment often offsets much of that disadvantage with the C-130 being the first aircraft on the scene. For example, the C-130, the first US airplane into Guatemala after its 1976 earthquake, landed only 18 hours after the quake occurred.

One reason the C-130 arrived before any other planes was because of its capability to operate into and out of unimproved, small airfields. This capacity allows tactical airlift operations and cargo movement closer to the areas of actual need. If the cargo cannot be airlanded, it can be airdropped, as it was by Air Force C-130s and C-123s in the remote Peruvian mountains in 1970. One crew completed their drop only after clearing a 16,000-foot mountain.²⁴ The C-141 aircraft can airdrop supplies as well but is limited in capability because of a lack of trained aircrews. While nearly all C-130 crews train for airdrops, few strategic airlift crews do. The 1970 Peruvian earthquake revealed the importance of the shortfield takeoff and landing capability of the C-130. While C-130s continued with the airdrops, engineers cleared and expanded an unimproved mountain airfield for the tactical aircraft. The C-130s then airlanded earthmoving equipment to clear the roads. There was not enough time or money to expand the field for a C-141 or C-5. With tactical airlift, we took the aid where it was needed much sooner than if tactical airlift had not been available.

There is also the advantage of sheer numbers of C-130 aircraft. The total C-130 inventory greatly outnumbers the combined C-141 and C-5 inventory. Although it carries a smaller load than strategic aircraft, the C-130 aircraft is stationed across the globe for easier and quicker response to emergencies. The highly visible, accessible, and usable nature of the aircraft makes it almost always the first choice for relief efforts by policy makers. Therefore, C-130 numbers and the "scheduled-airline type" mission the strategic airlift forces fly offset the payload disadvantage. Additionally, the "prepaid" mission of strategic airlift ties up much of the fleet at any one time, thus requiring a major effort to "free up" these planes for quick-response disaster-

relief missions. The tactical airlift fleet, because of the nature of its mission, is more readily available and is easily shifted into a relief role.

CONCLUSION

The United States clearly uses humanitarian aid as an extension or a facilitator of our foreign policy. At times, we have extended aid to show our support of a country or to try to stop the expansion of communism. At other times, we have refrained from sending aid or sent it through a third party because of our current foreign policy. Alexander Cockburn wrote in 1988, "Anyone still skeptical about the United States' use of relief aid as a political weapon should recall that . . . when Hurricane Gilbert hit Jamaica in September, the US immediately offered the Seaga government \$125 million in food and medical supplies. It is doubtful such largesse would have been forthcoming if Michael Manley were president. . . ."25

More often than not, tactical airlift does the job, and it has clearly been a major force in providing humanitarian relief during the past twenty years--as it was during the Berlin Airlift. Just as humanitarian aid supports our foreign policy around the world, airlift, specifically tactical airlift, is the vehicle which provides unmatched response and capability for carrying out our foreign policy. As Martin Caidin noted, ". . . the turboprop transports girdle the globe on missions dictated by national policy and needs. The Hercules is, first and foremost, that instrument of national policy."26

APPENDIX

DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN AID

January 1969-December 1988

AFRICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Disaster</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Algeria	Earthquake	1980	None	Cash only
Angola	Famine	1987	Unk	Provided food through UN
Angola	Famine	1988	Unk	Pledged 12,000 tons of food
Biafra	Famine	1970	C-141	Civil War Refugees (Note 1)
Cameroon	Homeless	1986	C-130	Poisonous gas from lake
Chad	Famine	1969	C-130	
Chad	Famine	1971	C-130	
Chad	Famine	1973	C-130	Authentic Assistance
Chad	Famine	1974	C-130	King Grain
Chad	Assistance	1988	C-5	
Ethiopia	Jewish airlift	1985	C-130	See note 2
Ethiopia	Famine	1988	Unk	Provided 272,566 tons of food
Ethiopia	Famine	1988	C-5	Moved helicopters for relief
Mali	Famine	1973	C-130	Authentic Assistance
Mali	Famine	1974	C-130	King Grain
Mauritania	Famine	1974	C-130	King Grain
Mauritius	Cyclone	1975	C-141	From Guam
Mauritius	Cyclone	1980	C-141	From Singapore
Mozambique	Famine	1987	Unk	
Mozambique	Famine	1988	Unk	Pledged 191,030 tons of food
Senegal	Locust	1988	C-141	Carried insecticide
Sudan	Flood	1978	C-141	From Rhein-Main and Guam
Sudan	Famine	1988	Unk	Provided \$43,000 of food aid
Sudan	Assistance	1988	C-5	
Sudan	Famine	1988	C-141	Plastic sheets to cover grain
Tunisia	Flood	1969	C-130	
Zaire	Drought	1979	C-141	Fast-growing seeds from Yuma Arizona

- NOTES: 1. This relief doesn't fully fall inside the scope of this study as the Biafrans were refugees from the civil war. By the same token, much of the Subsahara had been experiencing a famine during this period. The United States had been providing famine relief prior to 1970.
2. These Jewish refugees were secretly airlifted out of Sudan. These people were refugees from the on-going fighting in Ethiopia, but were also suffering from the famine.

DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN AID (Cont)

AFRICA

GOODWILL FLIGHTS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Gambia	Medical supplies	1984	C-141	AIDS research project from Andrews AFB
Mozambique	Goodwill	1985	C-141	From McGuire AFB
Zaire	Medical supplies	1984	C-141	AIDS research project from Andrews AFB

DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN AID (Cont)

MEXICO

<u>Disaster</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
Earthquake	1973	Unk
Flood	1973	Unk
El Chichon Volcano	1982	Unk
Mexico City Earthquake	1985	C-130 C-141 C-5
Hurricane Gilbert	1988	Unk

DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN AID (Cont)

LATIN AMERICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Disaster</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Barbados	Hurricane Allen	1984	Helicopter	No relief (Note)
Brazil	Famine	1983	None	
Brazil	Flood	1988	Unk	
Chile	Earthquake	1971	Unk	
Chile	Earthquake	1985	Unk	
Colombia	Earthquake/flood	1979	Unk	
Colombia	Earthquake	1983	Unk	
Colombia	Volcano	1985	C-130	
Colombia	Mudslide	1987	Unk	
Colombia	Hurricane floods	1988	Unk	
Costa Rica	Flood	1970	C-123	
Dominica	Hurricane Allen	1984	Helicopter	
El Salvador	Flood	1982	Unk	
El Salvador	Earthquake	1986	C-130 C-5	
Guatemala	Earthquake	1976	C-130 C-141 C-5	

DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN AID (Cont)

LATIN AMERICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Guyana	Jonestown	1978	C-141	Airlift Jim Jones victims
Haiti	Hurricane Allen	1984	Helicopter	
Haiti	Hurricane Gilbert	1988	C-130	
Honduras	Hurricane Fifi	1974	C-123	
			C-130	
			Helicopter	
Jamaica	Hurricane Allen	1984	Helicopter	
Jamaica	Flood	1986	C-130	
Jamaica	Hurricane Gilbert	1988	C-130	First arrived within 48 hours
			C-141	
			C-5	
Nicaragua	Earthquake	1972	C-130	
Nicaragua	Hurricane Joan	1988	None	No relief (Note)
Panama	Flood	1970	C-47	
			C-123	
Panama	Flood	1982	C-130	
Peru	Earthquake	1970	C-123	Navy involved as well
			C-130	
			C-118	
			C-133	
			C-141	
			C-5	
St Lucia	Hurricane Allen	1984	Helicopter	

NOTE: Neither country requested aid. Both cases are discussed in the study.

LATIN AMERICA

GOODWILL FLIGHTS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
Belize	Medical Supplies	1988	C-130
Bolivia	Mobile Medical	1970	C-130
	Program		
Bolivia	Construction	1972	C-130
	Equipment		
Bolivia	Medical Books	1988	C-130
Colombia	Medical Supplies	1988	C-130
Ecuador	Sawmill	1970	C-130
El Salvador	Fire Truck		C-130
St Lucia	Medical Supplies	1988	C-130
Venezuela	Equipment	1970	C-130
Venezuela	School Tour	1970	C-47
			C-130

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GLOSSARY¹

Foreign Policy--A strategy or planned course of action developed by the decision makers of a state vis a vis other states or international entities, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interest.

Military Strategy--The art and science of development and employment in war military resources and forces for the purpose of providing maximum support to national policy, in order to increase the likelihood and favorable consequence of victory.

Science predominates over art in military strategy

(Underlining added by author)

National Objective--The fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation toward which policies are directed and the efforts and resources of a nation are applied.

National Policy--A broad course of action or a statement of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.

National Security--1) The freedom--relative and absolute--of a nation from possible military attack or effective political or economic sabotage. 2) The military protection or defense of a state.

National Strategy--The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, sociological, and military resources as necessary during war and peace to afford the maximum support to national policies, and in the event of a

war, to increase the likelihood and favorable consequences of victory. Art predominates over science in national strategy. (Underlining added by author)

Strategic Airlift--The sustained air transportation of personnel and cargo between theaters, to provide long-range logistic support for a military operation. Military experts have designated the following aircraft as strategic: C-118, C-124, C-54, C-141, and C-5. The C-141 and C-5 can airdrop forces and supplies directly into the objective area, but their value is long-range transportation. Therefore, they primarily provide air transportation between theaters.

Tactical Airlift--An airlift that provides immediate movement and delivery of combat troops and supplies directly to the objective areas through air landing, extraction, airdrop, or other delivery techniques; it also provides the air logistic support of all theater forces. With this definition in mind, the following airlift aircraft have been the mainstay of tactical aircraft since the 1930s: C-46, C-47, C-119, C-123, and C-130.

²Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and Grace P. Hayes, Dictionary of Military Terms: A Guide to the Language of Warfare and Military Instruction (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1986); and Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-CLIO, 1988), pp. 7-8.